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But if some of the consequences of his action are outside of the sphere
of the benefits he is entitled to reap and of the drawbacks that are put
to his debit, he will not bother in his planning about all the effects of
his action. He will disregard those benefits which do not increase his
own satisfaction and those costs which do not burden him. His conduct
will deviate from the line which it would have followed if the laws
were better adjusted to the economic objectives of private ownership.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The most efficient means of distribution of scarce goods is private
ownership. When private ownership is either expressly allowed or gov-
ernment-use rules closely resemble private property, the good is put to its
most highly valued use. Rules of private property are especially necessary
when valuation of the commodity is unclear. When the efficiency of pri-
vate property exists, holders of goods must account for the goods' costs.
The failure to create efficient rules by financing outside of private capital
markets and the failure to properly institute property rights in spectrum
created the current problems with the C block spectrum auctioned off by
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission).
As part of the 1993 Budget Act, the FCC was given the power to use
2
auctions in awarding licenses for spectrum use. The original C block
spectrum auctions began December 18, 1995, and concluded May 6, 1996.3
The C block auction was for a designated portion of the spectrum called
Personal Communications Services (PCS). Personal Communications
Services networks provide users with wireless data transmissions, voice
transmissions, and electronic mail. Personal Communications Services is
• 4
expected to offer less expensive services with stronger connections.
Unlike the previous A and B block auction, reserved and dominated
by large bidders such as PrimeCo, Sprint Corporation, and AT&T Corpo-
ration, the C block auction was unique because it targeted smaller busi-
1. LuDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREAMTSE ON ECONOMIcS 655 (3d rev. ed.,
Henry Regnery Co. 1966).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 3090) (1994 & Supp. 111996).
3. FCC Report to Congress on Spectrum Auctions, Report, 13 F.C.C.R. 9601, 9612
tbl. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Spectrum Auction Report].
4. Mindy Blodgett, It's Time to Pay Up, COMPUrERWORLD, June 3, 1996, at 32.
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nesses that, in some cases, outbid large bidders by up to three times the A
and B block amount.5 In the short term, the C block auction appeared a re-
sounding success. By offering favorable terms to those companies quali-
fying under FCC guidelines as a small business, the bidding resulted in a
frenzy that drove up auction revenue. By the time the C block auction con-
cluded, the total amount bid for the C block was $10.2 billion.6 This was
7
more than double the revenue of the A and B blocks combined. For rea-
sons explained in this Note, the A and B block licensees paid an average
price of $16 per person covered in a territory (POP), while C block licen-
sees bid more than $40 per POP for a winning spectrum bid.8
While C block participants bid higher prices for spectrum, big bid-
ders who entered the market first achieved greater economies of scale than
newer companies. For instance, it was estimated that Sprint may have a 30
percent cost advantage over smaller companies. This advantage is accom-
plished because a company like Sprint can use national advertising at 50
percent the cost per viewer than a smaller company using local advertis-
ing.0 Economies of scale are not the sole problem for small bidders. Even
though conditions in the capital markets have been favorable, there was a
70 percent plunge in values of comparable debt and equity issuers." Wall
Street analysts have estimated the fair market value of the C block at $10
per POP, making it difficult for small bidders to raise the funds needed to
build the necessary infrastructure for their networks. 2
This led to the current problem. The C block rules required only a 10
percent down payment and then allowed payments to be made over ten
years.13 When those payments came due, C block licensees had trouble
meeting their obligations. In fact, three bidders filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy protection. General Wireless, which sought Chapter 11 protection,
still owes the FCC over $953.6 million for its PCS licenses,14 Pocket
5. Jared Sandberg, The Squeeze: Too Many PCS Providers Are Chasing the Same
Market, and the Result Isn't Pretty, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1997, at R22.
6. Curt Haler, Heads on the Block, COMM. INT'L, Aug. 1, 1997, at 20.
7. Id.
8. Riva Atlas, Trouble on the C Block- In Its Attempt to Help Out Entrepreneurs, the
Government Created a Mess with Wireless Auctions, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Aug. 1,
1997, at 41.
9. Sandberg, supra note 5.
10. Id.
11. Bruce R. Kraus, Pyrrhic Victory in Spectrum Auction, NAT'LL.J., Aug. 25, 1997, at
B15.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Second PCS "C" Block Bidder Files for Bankruptcy Protection, TR DAILY, Oct.
27, 1997.
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Communications, Inc., which bid $1.4 billion, asked for federal protection
in March of 1996,"5 and NextWave filed for bankruptcy protection on June
8, 1998.16 This turn of events concerning the C block forced the FCC to of-
fer a plan for auction winners to return spectrum to the FCC if necessary.
This spectrum was reauctioned in March 1999.17
This Note argues that the primary focus of the FCC should be the ef-
ficient distribution of property rights in spectrum. Efficiency in this con-
text means spectrum should be placed into the hands of the company or
person who values it most. This implies that the only goals of the FCC
should be to conduct auctions in an efficient manner and to grant winners
an ownership interest equivalent to private property that will be enforced
by the FCC. The C block auction demonstrates the difficulties that are
encountered when the FCC deviates from efficiency as a standard.
To properly discuss the relationship between efficiency, the FCC, and
spectrum policy, there are several issues that must be raised. First, why did
the FCC first move to an auction format to distribute spectrum? Second,
what goals was the FCC trying to accomplish by giving advantages to
small businesses? Third, what went wrong with the auction, and what at-
tempts have been made to fix it? This Note next suggests ways to fix the C
block problem within the given framework. Lastly, what exactly is effi-
ciency, how does it relate to a value-driven policy, and what would an effi-
cient spectrum policy look like? This Note's contention is that the best and
most efficient means of distributing the spectrum is an auction where
payment is required shortly after the winning bid is selected. Efficiency
requires that the highest bidder win the auction and that spectrum rights be
transmissible. It is this Note's contention that efficient spectrum policy re-
quires broadening property rights related to spectrum. This would include
the right to use the spectrum in whatever manner the owner deems to be in
his or her best interest.
15. Bryan Gruley & Quentin Hardy, Wireless Bidders in U.S. Threaten Default on
Debt, ASIAN WALL ST. J., June 27-28, 1997, at 16.
16. Alex Philippidis, NextWave Files Chapter 11 in Wake of Mounting Debt,
WESTCHESTER COUNTY Bus. J. (N.Y.), June 22, 1998, at 1.
17. FCC Sets C-Block Reauction for Next March, Whether Bankruptcies Are Resolved
or Not, PCS WEEK, Aug. 26, 1998 [hereinafter FCC Sets C-Block Reauction].
18. The enforcement role of the FCC should be limited to that of the government in
most property disputes. This would mean enforcing any use infractions by third parties.
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II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF FCC DISTRIBUTION OF SPECTRUM19
A. Comparative Hearings and Lotteries
Not all spectrum is available for public use. "Frequencies in the radio
spectrum are divided between federal and nonfederal use., 20 While the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)
allocates and assigns spectrum to federal users, the FCC has the responsi-
bility of managing the nonfederal part of the spectrum. For a long period
of time, the FCC managed and distributed the spectrum by means of com-
parative hearings.22 Comparative hearings employed a st~.ndard of the
"public interest, convenience, or necessity" in granting spectrum licenses.2
The advantage of a comparative hearing was that it gave an applicant
a quasi-judicial forum to argue its qualifications for spectrum over com-S 24
petitors. However, the hearing also had the drawback of being inefficient.
First, no guarantee existed that the competitor who valued the spectrum
most would be awarded it. Second, the procedure was costly to administer.
For example, original licenses for cellular services were awarded by com-
parative hearings. Cellular services were in high demand since they were a
scarce resource. The FCC received over 200 requests for the first thirty li-
censes.2 Many of these requests contained over 1,000 pages of documen-
tation and arguments supporting their claims for licensure.26
The next round of licensing garnered 344 applicants, while the third
round attracted 567 applicants.27 The Comnission's resources, especially
its time, were strained by the daunting task of reviewing and evaluating
applications in an equitable manner. Delay was also a problem during the
evaluation process. The process could last longer than two years, causing
large opportunity costs. These problems forced the FCC to consider lottery
assignments of spectrum as a superior distribution method and to ask Con-
gress for that authority.2
19. See generally Jonathan Blake, FCC Licensing: From Comparative Hearings to
Auctions, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 179 (1994).
20. Spectrum Auctions Report, supra note 3, at 9608.
21. Id.
22. Id. This method of distribution of spectrum is codified at 47 U.S.C. § 309(a)-(h)
(1994 & Supp. II 1996).
23. FCC Sets C-Block Reauction, supra note 17.
24. Spectrum Auctions Report, supra note 3, at 9608.
25. Id. at 9608-09.
26. Id. at 9609.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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In 1981, section 309(i) was included in the Communications Act.29
The process of a lottery was meant to make the distribution process cost
less while also taking less time than comparative hearings. 3 The problem
with the lottery system adopted by the FCC, however, was that any person
or entity could submit an application if it paid the application fee and met
minimal requirements.' After applications were submitted, the FCC would
select the winner of the license at random. Such a system immediately en-
couraged speculation by those not interested in creating cellular phone
systems. Because the FCC abandoned its application screening process in
1987, almost 400,000 firms claimed to provide spectrum in order to obtain
licenses.32
A significant secondary market emerged from the lottery system used
by the FCC. While the initial license almost never went to the entity that
valued it most, the absence of anti-trafficking restrictions eventually al-
lowed the market to allocate licenses to the most valued user. This secon-
dary transaction created a large incentive for rent seeking regarding the
windfall profits that could be made on a secondary sale.33 The price of an
application being low, a large incentive for speculation was reaffirmed.
Despite these drawbacks, there is a part of the lottery system that was
efficient-eventually licenses went to firms that valued them most. The
downside, what made the lottery inefficient, was transaction costs associ-
ated with the process. Transaction costs for the year 1991 were estimated
to be $190 million.34 The main cost was associated with the time it took the
license to be delivered to its highest valued user. On average, this was
about two years.35 Since during the delay, the eventual user/customer was
denied service, the social cost of the lottery system was quite high. One
estimation of social cost for the ten-year delay in licensing of cellular pro-
viders was 2 percent of Gross National Product (GNP).36
Both comparative hearings and the lottery system overburdened the
ability of the FCC to distribute spectrum efficiently.37 Comparative hear-
ings were wasteful because the amount of effort put into the process was
29. 47 U.S.C. § 309(i) (1994).
30. Spectrum Auctions Report, supra note 3, at 9609.
31. Christine E. Enemark, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena: Forcing the Federal
Communications Commission into a New Constitutional Regime, 30 CoLuM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 215, 219 (1997).
32. Spectrum Auctions Report, supra note 3, at 9609.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 9610.
35. Id. at 9609-10.
36. Id. at 9610.
37. Id.
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detailed and time consuming. Comparative hearings also failed in the end
to give spectrum to the highest valued user. On the other hand, the lottery
was inefficient because the time it took to distribute licenses in the secon-
dary market created a large social cost. In addition, the large amount of
speculation caused the cost of license application production to rise to
nearly $300 million. It should be noted that both systems failed to raise
revenue for the government. In the lottery system, the profits went to the
few speculators who were fortunate enough to win a piece of the spectrum.
Comparative hearings failed to raise revenue because the FCC did not re-
ceive valuable consideration for the spectrum distributed.
B. Auctions
In general, the move to an auction format for spectrum distribution
has been relatively successful. During the first four years of spectrum auc-
tions, 4,300 licenses were awarded to auction winners who are, or will be,
providing service to the public. 39 Revenue from the spectrum auctions
during that four-year period totaled $23 billion with $12 billion already
collected by the U.S. Treasury.4° Of the licenses awarded, 53 percent were
awarded to small businesses following the tone of 47 U.S.C. § 3090). This
success led Congress to extend auction authority until 2007, encompassing
more radio spectrum.
4 1
Most important to the intent of Congress is that auction costs tend to
ward off speculators. Revenue raised by auctions is collected by the Treas-
ury, whereas revenue under a lottery system goes to speculators. Auction
winners, those who value the spectrum most, are more likely to implement
services quickly. The FCC has broad authority to experiment with bidding
techniques to protect the public interest and promote certain objectives of
Congress. These objectives include the development and deployment of
technology and services in a speedy fashion, diverse spectrum licensees to
spur economic development and competition, and recovery of the com-
mercial value of the spectrum for the public.42 Also, a stated objective is
the efficient use of spectrum. These goals and objectives are reflected in
FCC auction design.
A successful auction of spectrum should result in an efficient distri-
bution of this scarce resource to those who are willing to pay the highest
38. Id.
39. Id.at9611.
40. Id. at 9603.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 9611.
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price.43 Of particular importance to the design of FCC spectrum auctions
was the allowance for license aggregation and the prevention of collusion
in the bidding process.44 The nature of the market makes license aggrega-
tion a prime consideration for potential bidders. The desirability of license
aggregation can be demonstrated by the cellular service needs of the aver-
age consumer. When a person is driving in a car throughout a geographical
area, he or she does not want to lose service. One solution would be for the
cellular user to contract with several providers in an area, but this would
entail the high transaction costs of contracting with different providers.
The best solution would be for a provider to aggregate service over a given
area.
Aggregation of licenses can be accomplished by two means. The first
is by geographic area.4 - A company may wish to purchase many contigu-
ous geographic areas on the same frequency band to offer seamless service
to customers. This would also allow a company to pool marketing costs
and bargain for band use on the border of a geographic region. Second, a
firm may wish to aggregate frequency bands within a given geographic
area in order to increase the company's bandwidth. By designing an auc-
tion encouraging license aggregation, development of new technologies
and services becomes feasible where it would otherwise not be within a
limited license framework. Firms developing new technologies or services
would not be able to recoup development costs without servicing a broad
area.
The other general objective of an auction design is to prevent collu-
sion. It is difficult to prevent collusion because bidders need to have in-
formation on other participants' bidding behavior.47 Larger amounts of in-
formation available to all participants create a more efficient auction
because bids are more likely to reflect a participant's actual valuation.4
When various participants obtain more information on a competitor's bid-
ding behavior, the opportunity to collude with other participants increases.
This dual-edged sword characterization resulted in the strict FCC rules
preventing collusion. Firms that applied for the right to bid for common
markets were prohibited from discussing, collaborating, disclosing their
bidding strategies, or revealing the substance of their bids.49 The FCC also
43. Id. at 9616.
44. Id. at 9616-18.
45. Id. at 9616.
46. Id. at 9617.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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relied on existing antitrust laws to keep bidders from colluding.50 Auction
applicants were required to and still must identify parties with whom they
have joint ventures, partnerships, or other agreements.5' Parties are then
restricted in communicating bidding strategy to only these firms.52
The primary auction used by the FCC for spectrum distribution is the
Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction.5 3 The auction's format is as fol-
lows:
(1) Interdependent spectrum licenses with the potential for substantial
aggregation or substitution are grouped and sold at the same time.
(2) All bidders submit bids over a sequence of rounds.
(3) At the end of each round, the high bid for each license determines
who would be the winner of that license if no higher bids were later
received, and also helps fix minimum acceptable bids for the next
round.
(4) Bidders that fail to submit bids in a round and do not have suffi-
cient standing high bids risk losing eligibility to submit bids in later
rounds.
(5) All licenses remain open for bidding until bidding has ceased on all
licenses. 4
Before the auction begins, sufficient up-front payments are made for
the licenses sought. This form of auction provides more information to
bidders about the values of other licenses and allows them to shift their
bidding to other licenses.55 The Simultaneous Multiple-Round Auction is
only effective if rules are developed to allow withdrawals, stopping, and
certain mandatory activity levels. This auction framework has been suc-
cessful when the ability to pay for the winning bid is established by the
participant, but as will be seen by the special designation for the C block
auction, it can fail when the FCC allows outside non-economic normative
values57 to affect its payment program.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 9618 box 3.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 9620.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. In this context, the term "normative values" defines those values that some
(including the majority of Americans) may think are socially advantageous but are not ra-
tional from an economic perspective. The desire to place spectrum in the hands of minority
and woman-owned businesses falls into this category. While the FCC, Congress, and the
American public may desire these outcomes, they are not economic values. Economic val-
ues are primarily concerned with allowing individuals to maximize their own production of
goods and services. This Note argues that any company should be allowed to bid for spec-
trum, and that the company paying the most for it can put it to its best productive use.
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Il. THE FCC'S GOALS IN THE C BLOCK AUCTION
The fear exists that a pure auction may not create sufficient opportu-
nities for minority, woman-controlled firms and small businesses. This
was the primary concern in creating the C block auction. Congress ex-
pressed this concern in section 309(j)(3)(B) of the Communications Act by
requiring the FCC to avoid "excessive concentration of licenses and by
disseminating licenses among a wide variety of applicants, including small
businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by members
of minority groups and women."58 Congress was concerned that a pure
auction might result in an increased concentration of the telecommunica-
tions industry with fewer firms, thus reducing competition. 9
A. Before Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena
Originally therefore, the FCC created special designations for the C
block. Bidders were qualified to participate if they had gross revenues not
exceeding $125 million in each of the prior two years and total assets of
less than $500 million at the time of application. 6 The FCC also developed
special rules for woman and minority-owned businesses. While small
businesses that had revenues for each of the past three years could receive
a bidding credit of 10 percent, 61 woman and minority-owned businesses
received a bidding credit of 15 percent. 62 Businesses that qualified under
both categories would receive a 25 percent bidding credit.63
In addition to bidding credits, installment payment plans were insti-
tuted by the FCC. If an applicant qualified for the C block auction and bid
for licenses in the fifty largest Basic Trading Areas (BTAs), then it could
obtain an installment payment plan.64 A company also qualified for the in-
stallment plan if it had less than $75 million in gross revenues. 6' Finally, a
special installment method for payment was lanned for all women and
minority-owned businesses with winning bids.
58. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(B) (1994).
59. H.R. REP. No. 103-111, at 254-55 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378,
581-82.
60. 47 C.F.R. § 24.709(a)(1) (1998).
61. Implementation of Section 3090) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bid-
ding, Fifth Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5532, para. 130, 75 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 859
(1994).
62. Id. paras. 133-34.
63. Id. para. 133.
64. Id. para. 137.
65. Id.
66. Id. paras. 13940.
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B. Post-Adarand Changes in FCC C Block Policies
On June 12, 1995, the Supreme Court decided Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena.6 7 Adarand significantly impacted the structure of the C block
auction. The Court held: "[A]ll racial classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state, or local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a review-
ing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications are con-
stitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compel-
ling governmental interests. 68
This decision was handed down by the Court just three days before
the initial short application form for the C block auction was due.69 The
FCC decided to postpone the C block auction until the Commission re-
ceived input from potential bidders and evaluated what impact the Ada-
rand decision would have on the auction.
Following Adarand, the FCC decided three goals were to be pursued
by the Commission. First, additional market competition needed to be in-
troduced by the rapid delivery of wireless services of C block licensees.
Second, the FCC wanted to reduce the risk of a future legal challenge to
the auction under the new Adarand standard. Lastly, the Commission was
concerned with keeping disruption of an applicant's plans to a minimum.
Minimal disruption was important because many potential bidders were in
the advanced stages of planning when Adarand was announced.70
The FCC opted to define its categories purely in financial terms.
Rather than only allowing minority-owned businesses to receive equity fi-
nancing, any small business that qualified could obtain equity financing up
to 49.9 percent.7' This meant that so long as the applicant, or its control
group, controlled 50.1 percent of the applicant's total equity, then the
small business applicant could obtain outside financing for the rest of the• 72
capital needed to bid for a C block license. Those applicants who could
obtain an installment payment schedule were also specified in financial
terms. The FCC created three different financial classifications for poten-
tial bidders.
67. Adarand, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
68. Id. at 227.
69. Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bid-
ding Amendment of the Comm'n's Cellular PCS Cross-Ownership Rule, Sixth Report and
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 136, para. 4, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 934 (1995) [hereinafter Competi-
tive Bidding Sixth Report and Order].
70. Id. para. 1.
71. 47 C.F.R. § 24.709(b)(4)(i) (1998).
72. Id. § 24.709(b)(6)(i).
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All bidders were required to first make a down payment of 10 percent
of the company's winning bid.73 The first 5 percent was payable within
five business days after the auction closed, and the second 5 percent was
payable within five business days after the application was granted.74 If a
winning bidder had gross revenues exceeding $75 million in each of the
two preceding years, then the winner was to pay both principal and interest
over the term of the license.75 The interest payment at this tier was the
"ten-year U.S. Treasury obligations applicable on the date the license was
granted, plus 3.5 percent. 76 The second tier was for those companies or
firms whose gross revenues did not exceed $75 million for each of those
two preceding years.77
The companies that qualified for this second-tier qualification were
only responsible for the interest payments during the first year, and then
payments included interest and principal amortized over the remaining
78
nine years of the license. Interest rates were the same ten-year Treasury
obligations, but the additional percentage added to that amount was only
792.5 percent. While these terms were favorable, the most lucrative pay-
ment schedule was reserved for those bidders who qualified as small busi-
nesses.so A small business for purposes of C block bidding was defined as
an entity that, together with any affiliates or ownership interests, had aver-
age annual gross revenues of not more than $40 million in any of the three
preceding years. 8' The installment payments for these small businesses
were at the rate of the ten-year Treasury obligation on the date the license
was granted. The first six years were to consist only of interest payments,
and the last four years were to be amortized interest and principal pay-
82
ments. These changes in light of Adarand had consequences that im-paired the ability to collect winning bids in the C block auction.
73. Id. § 24.711(a)(2).
74. 47 C.F.R. § 24.711(a)(2) (1997) (superseded 1998). Current FCC regulations have
changed the amounts and timing of payments attributed to the winning bidder's down pay-
ment and balance of payments.
75. 47 C.F.R. § 24.711(b)(1) (1998).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 24.711(b)(2).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. § 24.711(b)(3).
81. Id. § 24.720(b)(1).
82. 47 C.F.R. § 24.711 (b)(3) (1997) (superseded 1998). Current FCC regulations have
changed, the result being that the current rate of interest is the ten-year U.S. Treasury obli-
gation rate plus 2.5%. Payments of interest only are for a period of two years, with the
payments of interest and principal amortized over eight years.
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C. Goals of the FCC
The FCC was forced into a precarious position that caused certain
failures in the C block auction. The first failure was an attempt to reconcile
two different goals that were contradictory in nature. Congress explicitly
wanted the FCC to ensure the diversification of spectrum ownership. To
this end, the FCC was to "disseminat[e] licenses among a wide variety of
applicants, including small businesses, rural telephone companies, and
businesses owned by members of minority groups and women." 83 The dis-
semination of licenses to minority groups and women through the C block
auction was frustrated by the Supreme Court's ruling in Adarand, and the
FCC decided to modify its auction rules.
When the FCC changed its rules to draw distinctions using financial
definitions exclusively, it also hoped that these changes would encompass
Congress's concerns about minorities and women. The rule change was an
attempt to define a nonsuspect group in financial terms, and the FCC
hoped this group would significantly correlate with the woman and minor-
ity-owned businesses that Congress wanted to aid. The FCC commented
on its changed rules by saying: "Although the revised rules do not specifi-
cally target minorities and women, we realize that because a large number
of minority- or women-owned businesses are small businesses, our new
rules will nonetheless, afford designated entities opportunities to partici-
pate in the C block auction."' 4
The FCC recognized that such tracing of groups is incomplete and
that some minority and woman-owned businesses would not be able to use
the most favorable installment plans available for the C block auction.85
While some companies would be burdened by the new rules, the Comnis-
sion believed that other values outweighed those financial burdens. These
other values were the need to reduce litigation risks, to increase market
86
competition, and to promote rapid service to the public.
It should be noted that these were the only goals related to the mi-
nority and woman-owned business portion of the congressional mandate.
Additionally, Congress stated that the goals of the FCC included promot-
ing the efficient use of the spectrum, promoting economic opportunity, de-
veloping new technologies, and recovering the value of the spectrum for
the public.8 While the FCC was to consider monetary recovery of the
spectrum's value for the public, it was forbidden to use the expectation of
83. 47 U.S.C. § 3090)(3)(B) (1994).
84. Competitive Bidding Sixth Report and Order, supra note 69, para. 42.
85. Id.
86. Id. para. 43.
87. 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(A)-(D) (1994).
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auction revenue for the federal government as a "finding of public interest,
convenience, and necessity."" These competing goals are not only difficult
to achieve by one federal agency, but both goals may be contradictory and
therefore impossible to pursue all at once. For reasons explained later in
this Note, the primary goals of the Commission should be efficiency and
the establishment of property rights in spectrum. This means putting spec-
trum in the hands of those who value it most. While this may simultane-
ously raise revenue for the federal government, efficiency, not revenue
maximization should be the first concern of the Commission.
IV. WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE AUCTION AND How IT IS
BEING FIXED
The main problem facing the FCC was that many auction winners
expressed concerns with meeting payments to the Commission. In fact, as
noted before, three bidders in the C block auction have declared bank-
ruptcy. This created further predicaments when considering how spectrumS 89
licenses should be treated in bankruptcy proceedings. Are such licenses
property interests protected by the bankruptcy law, or do these licenses
forfeit back to the FCC, which can then reauction them?90 These are just
some of the consequences of the C block auction that should be addressed
in any FCC attempt to fix the problem.
A. What Went Wrong?
The primary problem in the C block auction is two-fold. First, the
initial A and B block auction involved participants who were, for the most
part, seasoned veterans of the communications industry. This gave those
participants a head start for building the infrastructure necessary for any
88. Id. § 309(j)(7)(A)-(B).
89. In the case of General Wireless Inc., bankruptcy protection has produced favorable
results. Judge Steven A. Felsenthal ruled that no exchange of reasonably equivalent value
occurred, and this fell under the bankruptcy code's definition of "fraudulent conveyance."
See Bankruptcy Judge Lowers Value of GWI"s Licenses; Outstanding Debt Reduced to $60
Million, PCS WEEK, Apr. 29, 1998 [hereinafter Bankruptcy Judge Lowers Value]. Judge
Felsenthal determined the appropriate value of C block licenses by comparing them to F
block PCS counterparts. This means that approximately $894 million of debt will be
avoided. Id. As of October 9, 1998, the U.S. District Court and the Fifth U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals have turned down the FCC's request to have the ruling stayed. See C-Block Li-
censee Rises from Chapter 11 Ashes, WIRELESS TODAY, Oct. 9, 1998.
90. At this time, the FCC will not include C block licenses involved in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings to be reauctioned. This will create the need for further auctions as these licenses
are reclaimed. Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Fi-
nancing for Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licensees, Fourth Report and Order,
13 F.C.C.R. 15,743, para. 15, 13 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 220 (1998) [hereinafter Installment
Payment Fourth Report and Order].
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PCS network. They also had substantially more cash and capital resources
upon which to rely. This meant that winners of the first two auctions could
compete more aggressively on a price basis. It also meant that they had
experience in marketing, advertising, creating a service network, and infra-
structure maintenance, which newcomers to the industry (C block licen-
sees) did not have.
The second major problem is that the C block auction drove the val-
ues of spectrum licenses higher than their market value. This occurred be-
cause small businesses were not able to realize the true up-front costs.
Since these types of companies had ten years to pay the cost of the auction
at interest rates below market value, sometimes with the aid of bidding
credits, it was difficult for a company to estimate what it could afford to
bid. Therefore, there was a tendency to overbid. The idea for such lenient
terms was that the company would be able to make payments over the ten-
year period with profits derived from that license. This estimation of future
profits was imperfect.
When an economically rational company decided to bid on a C block
auction, it first needed to determine what costs it would incur over the life
of the license. After that, there existed a need to estimate projected reve-
nues from operations of the PCS license. Using the estimated profits over
the next ten years and reducing that amount to its present value, the firm
could have determined a rational bid. This rational bid would represent a
close market approximation of the value of the license. The problem with
this simple formula for valuation of licenses and appropriate bids was the
information costs associated with such future projections.
It should be remembered that the FCC was encouraging the introduc-
tion of small businesses into the PCS market. Since the requirement of a
small business was that it have less than $40 million in gross revenue for
each of the last three years, and considering the high cost of entry into the
communications industry, it can be assumed that many of these small
businesses had little experience in determining the valuation of licenses.
Therefore, they were unable to determine optimal bids. Even if these small
companies were controlled by persons with experience in the industry,
PCS was and is a new technology where much is expected and little is
certain. Information is highly imperfect in such a situation. It is safe to say
that some bidders incorrectly determined the optimum bid.
What seemed to occur instead was a sort of "feeding frenzy." With
highly unknown profits ahead, most companies thought of PCS as an un-
limited gold mine. Evidence exists that C block participants ignored mar-
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ket-setting valuation comparisons. 1 If a small firm with little experience is
attempting to evaluate a license, it is rational to predict it would look at
previous auctions of similar spectrum. In this case, those would be the A
and B block auction. This especially seems the case given A and B block
competition was greater with two potential licenses for each market and
the participants had "deep corporate pockets."92 The C block auction may
have turned into a speculative frenzy because the bidders failed to observe
the experience of larger wireless concerns in the A and B block auction.93
This seems to be supported by the fact that the average price per POP in
the C block auction was more than triple that in the A and B block auction.
Gross speculation concerning the valuation of spectrum was not par-
ticipated in by all bidders. Two significant bidders, U.S. Airwaves and
PersonalConnect Communications, left the auction block when total bid-
ding surpassed the $7 billion mark.14 While U.S. Airwaves planned to cre-
ate a national presence in the auction by creating alliances with other win-
ners, the company departed the auction because it believed bidding was at
an unacceptable level and the markets to be created were not economically
viable. This implies that even considering strong financial backing the li-
censes in the C block were overvalued.95
While some businesses in the C block may have had strong financial
backing, general financing may have been another cause of the C block's
problems. Most C block bidders failed to arrange adequate financing be-
96fore the auction took place. This is just the opposite of what companies
participating in the A and B block auction did. C block bidders believed
they would obtain financing before the auction because that financing was
readily available to larger concerns like Sprint PCS. 97 This was a mistake
on the part of the small businesses involved because such previous fi-
nancing was probably obtained through brand-name leverage. The small
businesses involved in the C block auction had little experience, no brand
name, and were forced to compete with larger concerns. 98 It was error to
believe that financing for the start-up of wireless service would easily oc-
cur after the auction was completed.
91. Bankruptcy Judge Lowers Value, supra note 89 (discussing a bankruptcy court's
decision that licenses were overvalued).
92. Marc Cabi, Finding a Resolution for the FCC's C-Block PCS Auction Debacle,
RCR RADIO COMM. REP., Sept. 15, 1997, at 24.
93. Id.
94. Jason Meyers, Two C Block High Rollers Fold, TELEPHONY, Feb. 26, 1996, at 10.
95. Id.
96. Cabi, supra note 92.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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B. What Was Done to Fix the Problem?
On October 16, 1997, the FCC released an Order giving winners of
licenses in the C block auction four options regarding their licenses and
payments." The first of these options was to continue present payments for
the licenses won.0 Second, one could follow a disaggregation plan.'0 ' Un-
der this plan, a C block licensee may have surrendered 50 percent of its
spectrum to the FCC for reauction.'0 Third, a C block licensee may have
given all of its licenses back to the FCC, and then all of its remaining C
block license debt would be forgiven. 103 The last option involved paying up
front the remaining costs without interest.'04 This allowed the licensee to
use 70 percent of its down payment and any new money to pay off the C
block licenses won.' 5 Any licenses not prepaid would then be forfeited
back to the FCC for reauction.106
There were many other solutions suggested, including changing the
amount owed for licenses, which the FCC rejected."' It is believed that
such changes were not in the public's best interest. Among many policies
advocated by the FCC supporting the four-option Order, one included re-
assuring the integrity of the auction process. Considering those that par-
ticipated in the auction but did not win, the FCC sought to ensure fairness
to all participants in the auction process. This included those who won li-
censes in other auctions like the A and B block. °9 Another concern of the
FCC was not merely to postpone the situation, but to make a decision that
resolved the issue in a rapid fashion. Two other policies supported by the
FCC were creating certainty in the auction process and promoting eco-
nomic diversity and competition in the spectrum market." °
Regarding the first option of continuing installment payments, all in-
stallment payments for C block PCS licenses were suspended on March
99. Amendment of the Comm'n's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Financing for
Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licensees, Second Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 12 F.C.C.R. 16,436, 9 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1100 (1997)
[hereinafter Installment Payment Second Report and Order].
100. Id. para. 6.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. para. 5.
108. Id. para. 2.
109. Id.
110. Id. paras. 2, 4.
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31, 1997, until further notice.Im In order to avoid delay, those wishing to
continue their installment payment plans were required to begin payment
with the Suspension Orders rescission. This occurred on March 31,
1998.112 There was a sixty-day grace period after which licensees who did
not submit payments or choose another option were in default.' 3 Payments
that were to have been made during the suspension period are payable over
a two-year period, making one eighth of the suspension period amount due
with each quarterly payment.' 4 No extensions past the sixty-day grace pe-
riod were permitted by the FCC."
5
The second option, which allowed the surrender of half of a com-
pany's spectrum to the FCC for reauction, was designed to disallow win-
ners from benefiting at the FCC's expense. The FCC allowed an entity
owning C block spectrum to disaggregate to another C block eligible entity
for the first five years following the license.116 The entity buying the spec-
trum was and is allowed to make the same installment payments as the
original designated entity. 17 After the five-year period, a company may
disaggregate to any non-entrepreneur block licensee so long as the FCC is
compensated for unjust enrichment regarding the amount of spectrum."I
When disaggregating half of the spectrum back to the FCC, the C
block licensee must have disaggregated half of the spectrum (15 MHz) it
has across all BTAs in a Major Trading Area (MTA). 9 The reason for this
is simple. The company must disaggregate 50 percent across such a large
area to avoid choosing which spectrum is advantageous for it to give back
to the government. If a company were allowed to disaggregate whatever
amount of spectrum it chose, it could selectively keep the spectrum in the
best market or give back the spectrum if it believed the bid price exceeded
the market value of the spectrum.
120
While the FCC reduced the debt owed by half, the government re-
tained the portion of the down payment applicable to the spectrum.2 All
previous installment payments were applied to reduce the amount of inter-
est over the suspension period from March 31, 1997 to March 31, 1998,
111. Id. para. 23.
112. Id. para. 25.
113. Id.
114. Id. para. 27.
115. Id. para. 30.
116. Id. para. 32.
117. Id.
118. Id.; 47 C.F.R. § 24.714(c)(1) (1998).
119. Installment Payment Second Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 38.
120. Id.
121. Id. para. 40.
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and were to be made over the first eight payments commencing on March
31, 199 8 .2= Finally, in order to avoid unjust enrichment, C block licensees
electing this option were prohibited from bidding in the subsequent reauc-
tion of spectrum disaggregated from the licensee or reacquiring the disag-
gregated spectrum by a secondary market transaction for a two-year pe-
riod.'23
The amnesty option did not contain as many difficulties as the 50
percent disaggregation plan. Part of this is due to the fact that "cherry
picking" of favorable pieces of spectrum was eliminated. 24 The amnesty
option allowed any C block licensee to surrender all licenses in spectrum
for a relief from all payments on that spectrum. This included waiver of
any default payments and return of prior installment payments made.' 5 By
allowing an amnesty option, the FCC attempted to speed use of C block
spectrum to licensees who could afford to implement systems to use the
spectrum. Consistent with the implementation goal set by Congress, a
company that has built-out a system could keep the spectrum being used
.... 126
and qualify for amnesty for the remaining licenses. If a company chose
this option, the build-out must have occurred prior to the FCC Second Re-
port and Order in question, and, to avoid cherry-picking, the company
must keep all other BTAs within the MTA that has been built-out.
127
Because the FCC allows an entity opting for amnesty to bid in any
reauction, there must be adequate measures against allowing unjust en-
richment. The method chosen by the FCC was to retain the down payment
from the original C block auction. 12 By retaining 10 percent of the bid
payment (the amount of the initial down payment), an adequate penalty
was created to discourage speculation At the same time, the licensee
benefits by avoiding default payments and gaining a chance to stay in the
spectrum market in the reauction. Since default in this option is avoided,
the licensee's creditworthiness is not damaged for application to other fed-
eral loan programs."O
Under the prepayment option, a C block licensee must have prepaid
for a license, and the remaining licenses not paid for must have been sur-
122. Id.
123. Id. para. 42.
124. Id. para. 56.
125. Id. paras. 53, 58.
126. Id. para. 57.
127. Id.
128. Id. pam. 55.
129. Id.
130. Id.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
rendered to the FCC. 13' The licensees who selected prepayment could have
used 70 percent of their total down payments made on licenses that they
chose to surrender. The licensee may then use any additional "new
money" to pay for its licenses under the prepayment option. 33 By only al-
lowing licensees to use 70 percent of down payments from surrendered li-
censes as pre-payment for retained licenses, the FCC hoped that the 30
percent loss would act as a deterrent to excessive bidding in future auc-
tions. 34 To have permitted a C block licensee to use 100 percent of the for-
feited license down payment would be unfair to those who lost the auction
and to those who continued to pay under the original payment structure.
35
A large amount of debate surrounded what amount should be prepaid
for a license. There are three possible ways such amounts could have been
changed. First, the C block auction bid price could have been reduced to
prices paid for comparable A and B block licenses. 36 Second, the bid price
could have remained unchanged, just prepaid.137 Third, the price of the
winning bid could have been reduced to its present value, and then pre-
payment would occur. The FCC opted for the second possibility and de-
cided to keep the bid price the same under the prepayment option.39 The
FCC maintains the reason for this choice was that it was the only method
of calculation that was fair to other licensees. "In other words, licensees
should pay what they bid."'1'4
Finally, to avoid selective "cherry picking" of licenses, the FCC lim-
ited which licenses could be surrendered.' 4' Again, a C block entity must
have prepaid all BTAs within an MTA. The licensee could not just selec-
tively choose which licenses to forfeit while repaying others.' 42 An excep-
tion to this existed if the licensee did not have sufficient funds to prepay all
BTA licenses within the MTA. 43 Any licensee must have prepaid for all
licenses within an MTA that it could afford, if it had enough money to pay
for more than one license, but not all licenses within the MTA. Also, if a
131. Id. para. 64.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. para. 65.
135. Id.
136. Id. para. 66.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. para. 67.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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firm surrendered a license, it was prohibited from reacquiring that license
in a secondary market transaction for two years.144
The FCC's four options for C block winners have been met with
mixed results. According to PCS Week, the numbers are as follows: "120
licenses in bankruptcy, 144 returned, 119 disaggregated, 87 resuming
payments (including 3 for which no election was made and 6 for which de-
fective elections were made), 21 in the hands of the FCC, and 2 which
have already been paid off by licensees."'45 The FCC reauctioned spectrum
in its hands on March 23, 1999, the largest change being the elimination of
installment financing.' 46 The FCC retained the previous auction's eligibil-•147 148
ity parameters, sped up the final payment, and created bidding credits
• • - 149
for qualified entities. While these are steps in the right direction, they
simply provide a patch for the problems faced by Congress and the FCC.
It is not this Note's contention that the FCC necessarily caused the
problem in the execution of its auction. The rules of the auction were clear
and objective. The problem was the policy underlying the rules of the auc-
tion, specifically those rules creating special payment plans for small enti-
ties. This, combined with the shortsightedness of the bidders, was the ma-
jor problem of the C block auction. Given the fact that the FCC plans on
granting bidding credits to qualified entities, it still ignores the basic con-
ceptual problem. Economic reality dictates that winners be given a prop-
erty right in spectrum and that auctions reward winners who value the
spectrum most.
V. How SHOULD THE C BLOCK AUCTION BE REMEDIED
WITHIN THE GIVEN FRAMEWORK?
As a scarce good, the spectrum's distribution will be efficient if two
things occur. First, the spectrum should be distributed to those who value it
most. Secondly, from a societal perspective, there should be sufficient
competition in the market to ensure accurate prices. However, one thing
that must be avoided in this process is a dramatic change in the rules.
Companies can only make rational long and short-term decisions when
they can count on regulatory law being predictable.5 ° If the FCC was to
144. Id. para. 69.
145. C-Block Restructuring: Official Election Decisions, PCS WEEK, June 24, 1998.
146. FCC Sets C-Block Reauction, supra note 17.
147. Installment Payment Fourth Report and Order, supra note 90, para. 13.
148. Id. para. 35.
149. Id. paras. 45-46.
150. Relating to the issue of predictability, many C block winners are skeptical of stay-
ing in the PCS market because the FCC has made the situation too unstable. The CEO of
Quantum Communications Group, Inc. noted his disgust with the FCC because the rules
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change the rules of the auction or the corresponding payment plans in an
ad hoc fashion, significantly deviating from the prior rules, companies in-
volved in future auctions would be frustrated. The uncertainty of FCC
changes would have to be projected into current bids, causing further
means by which valuations could deviate from the actual market value.
All of this means that when the FCC attempted to correct the prob-
lems with the C block winners' ability to pay for their winning bids, the
goals of competition and placing spectrum with its most valued user
should have been balanced with the need to be consistent with prior rules.
This is not to say that when the FCC designs future auctions it should not
publicly change the policy and rules it will follow, but that when correct-
ing prior mistakes the word of the issuing agency must be considered good
to potential bidders. Within this framework, the FCC should have only ei-
ther allowed those with winning C block bids to continue their present
payment plans or to have prepaid for their licenses at the net present value.
Also, companies should have been allowed to sell their spectrum to any
entity that can afford to buy it so long as one of the two following options
is utilized.
When the first option is chosen (paying under the current installment
plan), all concerns are taken into account. First, the rules of auction are
satisfied. This in some way means a "deal is a deal." Fairness to losing
bidders is upheld because the winner is not given favorable treatment.
Also, the word of the FCC is not broken. Those participating in future
auctions will be able to depend upon the FCC, allowing winners to follow
the terms of the auction. This option is not completely efficient, but the
partial loss of efficiency is compensated by the informational efficiency
(entities can count on the terms of the FCC) created in the future.
When a firm keeps its obligations under the current installment pay-
ment plan, there is a good chance more competition will enter the market.
If the spectrum was allowed to be sold, and the new owner paid under this
option, competition would still be enhanced. This means that prices would
tend more toward a competitive market because the number of firms is in-
creasing. By allowing the original winner to sell to another party, those
entities that could have secured better financing may have gained control
of spectrum and would have brought it to the market quickly. This would
create a more efficient market by increasing competition and would still
closely following the original terms.
would change whenever he developed a spectrum strategy. "'I finally got so frustrated be-
cause I couldn't make any sound decisions."' Few C-Block Licensees Willing to Stay the
Course with the FCC, COMM. TODAY, June 15, 1998.
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Unfortunately, there would be some inefficiency because spectrum
does not necessarily gravitate toward those who value it most. While those
that won the C block bidding, or those willing to buy at that price, will re-
tain the license, others who truly value it more may not have access to
ownership. Part of this is due to the exclusion of nonentrepreneurial enti-
ties who may have wished to bid more at the original auction. While they
may be able to buy the spectrum on the secondary market, there is an inef-
ficiency because time has passed and the license may be less valuable. The
buyer may not now be willing to purchase because the spectrum was only
valuable before other networks were in place and operating.
Another reason that spectrum may not tend to gravitate to those who
value it most is the information problems with the auction. If firm A be-
lieves a license is worth $100 million and is willing to pay for it, and firm
B believes a license is worth $300 million and is willing to pay for it, then
the license will go to firm B. The problem exists when firm B inaccurately
estimates the true price of the license and the amount it can afford to pay.
For example, assume a particular license is worth $110 million, and be-
cause B, a small firm with little experience in the industry that needs
money to build the infrastructure, really only has money enough to bid $95
million. The license will go to B but should have gone to the firm that left
the auction at $100 million. This demonstrates the problem of normal de-
mand versus effective demand. The license may often go to the firm that
demands it more but does not have the resources to make the demand ef-
fective. This explains why the installment payment plan may not always
efficiently distribute spectrum.
Option two would have allowed an entity to pay for spectrum at its
net present value or allowed someone to purchase the spectrum from the
original winner and pay the FCC in this fashion. This option would have
been more efficient than the original installment plan but deviates from the
informational efficiency of not changing the rules. The FCC prepayment
plan differs in that it does not discount the bid to its present value, but in-
stead makes the company prepay the entire amount of the bid.51 The
Commission claims that in order to bring credibility and integrity to the
rules the amount due under prepayment must be the net high bid. So, un-
der the FCC proposal, the C block winner would have to prepay the entire
principal amount but not the interest due.
There was support for the net present value approach. Representa-
tives Edward J. Markey and W.J. Tauzin asked the FCC in a letter to sup-
port a full price buyout where the amount paid would have been the net
151. Installment Payment Second Report and Order, supra note 99, para. 66.
152. Id.
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present value of the net bid prices for the C block spectrum in question.13
This support was well placed. The net present value approach would not
have compromised the integrity of the auction rules. First, any licensee
would have been allowed to continue with the present system of install-
ment payments. This would satisfy literal compliance with the auction
rules.
Second, unlike a mortgage where the housing price and the financing
arrangement are separate entities, the bids for C block spectrum were dif-
ferent. The companies involved in the auction were bidding on a single
thing, paying for a license over ten years at low rates. This was the case
because the auction was designed for those entities that could almost never
afford to buy a license outside the installment payment system. The bid
price not only represents the spectrum but also encompasses the right to
not pay up front. By allowing up-front payment, the bid price must be re-
duced to the licensee's present value, in order to truly represent the present
market value of the spectrum.
In connection with efficiency, the "prepayment of net present value"
option had a couple of advantages. One advantage was that the FCC would
no longer be in the position of a long-term creditor because payment
would have occurred immediately. By making the FCC a creditor, an inef-
ficiency resulted because the agency was not equipped to assume that role.
One possible solution might have been to sell the creditor's rights of the
FCC in the private market.
The next large efficiency advantage of prepayment regards an aspect
of timing costs. The more delay that exists before new systems of C block
spectrum can be built-out, the more barriers to entry increase. This is due
to the fact that other providers will have had the advantage of experience,
an intact infrastructure, a price advantage, a market subscribed to its serv-
ices, and brand recognition. Part of this market advantage would be the
fact that existing service contracts may exist for some months into the fu-
ture creating a high transaction cost to switch services within the contract
period. This gives preexisting companies in the market time to react to any
new market participant.
Prepayment decreases the time before spectrum goes to market be-
cause any company that elected this option must surrender any spectrum
for which it could not prepay. Of course the relevant "cherry picking" pro-
visions must be in place, so that in a subsequent reauction the spectrum
will have some value to the market. Under the installment plan, it may be
several years before an entity realizes it cannot fully pay and must default
153. Id. para. 60.
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on some of its licenses. This delay may cause the spectrum to lose its value
because of existing competition in the market.
There was also an informational efficiency that would have been cre-
ated by using the net present value approach. A company would have had
immediate access to the true cost of a license and could have compared it
with existing market conditions. This would have applied to any entity that
attempted to buy the spectrum from the existing C block holder. The buy-
ing entity would have been able to judge the market conditions at the time,
whether it could make a profit, and whether the bid price is reasonable
considering these factors and the economic outlook. The installment plan
lacked this advantage because the bid price would have been analyzed over
the longer period of ten years, and specific market conditions would be-
come more unpredictable over time. It should be noted, however, that ei-
ther option created an interest rate risk if the buying entity took out interest
loans to prepay for the spectrum. It would consider which rate is more
profitable-buying the spectrum up front with a loan or accepting the FCC
terms for installment payments.
These two options, the current installment .plan by the original terms
of the C block auction and a prepayment plan at the bid's net present value
within the given framework, should have been given full consideration.
Together they would be the best solution obtainable while still remaining
true to the original terms and goals of the auction.
VI. WHAT EXACTLY Is EFFICIENCY, How DOES IT RELATE TO
A VALUE-DRIVEN POLICY, AND WHAT WOULD EFFICIENT
SPECTRUM POLICY LOOK LIKE?
To obtain a better idea of what efficient spectrum policy based on
economic principles would look like, it is necessary to understand what ef-
ficiency is. Often, the concept of efficiency is compared to value-driven
laws or regulations. While some may argue that the criminal law is effi-
cient, most see it as reflecting a different set of values not entirely based
on economic concerns. On the other hand, principles in contracts and torts
are sometimes solely based on economics. Rationally, it may seem that
most law falls somewhere in the middle; that is, some law is based on eco-
nomic notions of efficiency and property rights, while other areas of law
emphasize different protections of an individual's rights. An in-depth dis-
cussion of this dichotomy in other areas of law is outside the discussion of
this Note, but spectrum policy should be determined upon an efficiency
framework, based on objective, economic principles.
154. See generally RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 237-70 (5th ed.
1998).
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A. What Is Efficiency and How Does It Relate to the Concept of
Values?
Many consider economic efficiency and morals or values to be two
different methodologies of justifying law, regulation, and policy. It is not
uncommon to overhear a proponent of law and economics support a given
decision because it is efficient, and then hear an opponent decry the policy
because it ignores societal values. This type of categorization is a false di-
chotomy. Thus, the two categories can be reconciled. It really is the case
that efficiency is itself a value that can be chosen to justify a law or policy.
Ultimately, the question is what underlying beliefs create a particular
value.
Traditionally, efficiency comes from a value system that is utilitarian
in nature. A utilitarian believes that societal or individual happiness,
wealth, or prosperity should be maximized without regard to who bears the
ultimate burden. Utilitarianism itself is a moral theory. It derives from the
philosophical theory that morality is a form of hypothetical imperative.
This means that if X is a rational goal, and Y will achieve that goal, then Y
is the moral action.155 This demonstrates how efficiency and utilitarianism
are ultimately a value or moral judgment. If maximizing happiness or
prosperity is a rational goal, as most say it is, then a policy that is efficient
(creating the highest level of societal wealth or prosperity) is the moral
choice.
Utilitarianism is only one moral system justified by the hypothetical
imperative; a more rational argument can be made for a system that util-
izes the hypothetical imperative but does not have as its primary goal the
maximization of societal wealth and happiness (although these may be by-
products of that system). One of the best arguments for a moral system that
favors economic freedom, private property, and the efficiency thus created,
rests upon rational human nature. A person's only tool for survival is his
155. While not believing in its correctness, Immanuel Kant gives an accurate definition
of the hypothetical imperative. "The former [hypothetical imperatives] present the practical
necessity of a possible action as a means to achieving something else which one desires (or
which one may possibly desire).... The hypothetical imperative, therefore, says only that
the action is good to some purpose, possible or actual." KANT SELECTIONS 263 (Lewis
White Beck ed., 1988) (quoting from Kant's book Foundations of the Metaphysics of Mor-
als). An excellent example of the hypothetical imperative applied to ethics can be found in
the works of Aristotle. See generally 2 THE COMPLE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729-42
(Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle correctly argues that all
actions aim at some end. The point therefore of ethics is to choose moral ends that reflect
excellence. The most excellent of these ends that may be achieved is happiness.
"lH]appiness is an activity of soul in accordance with complete excellence .... Id. at
1741. This goal (happiness) is sought for its own sake, and moral actions are those acts that
will achieve happiness.
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mind. In order to survive, an individual must be productive, and this im-
plies using his mind to produce the means of his survival. This requires
that an individual be allowed to keep the products of his own labor; essen-
tially government's role is to establish property rights for this end.' 56 This
results in distribution of goods and services to those who value them most
and to those who will put them to their most productive use.
This can be compared to other noneconomic forms of value or moral
judgments often used to justify other areas like criminal law. While this
Note takes a contrary position, most believe that other moral goals (such as
"thou shall not steal") are not part of a hypothetical imperative. Rather
these morals take the form of a duty or rule. There is no justification for
murder or stealing; it is wrong every time. One has a duty to obey the rule
"thou shall not murder or steal."'157 These goals are not the means to an
end; they are the end. It is not that efficiency and economics are outside
the realm of morals or values, but that different areas of law are often justi-
fied by others who use different methodologies.
Rejecting this dichotomy, all areas of law including economic and
property law, contracts, torts, and criminal law have a common justifica-
tion. The law defines when the government can utilize force. This protects
individuals because it defines the very limited circumstances in which
force may be used in the social sphere. The main difference between areas
of law is their focus, and it is not the justification of different areas of law
with different methodologies. Economic areas of law seek to protect on-
going rights in property (usually this applies when no direct intentional use
of force has occurred). Areas such as criminal law seek to remedy the vio-
lation of an individual's rights by an act of force (physical or nonphysical)
that has been employed with some level of culpability.
Goods that are distributed by an efficiency standard are those that
traditionally have been classified as economic goods and thus usually fall
under property law. Moral goods are definable but lack characteristics
156. This argument was primarily advanced by the philosopher and novelist Ayn Rand.
She argued that the economics of property rights is based primarily on the fact that "man
has to work and produce in order to support his life. He has to support his life by his own
effort and by the guidance of his own mind." AYN RAND, CAPITALISM: THE UNKNOWN
IDEAL 18 (1967). To fully support his life, Rand argues, he must be able to dispose of the
fruits of his labor. Id.
157. This value theory represents the philosophy of Immanuel Kant who called this rea-
soning the categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is derived by the following
proposition: "There is, therefore, only one categorical imperative. It is: Act only according
to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal
law." KANT SELECTIONS, supra note 155, at 268. This means that moral principles are de-
rived by establishing their universal applicability. Unlike the hypothetical imperative, cate-
gorically derived moral principles do not seek an end.
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common to economic goods. Economic goods are usually material in form
because they are easier to measure and quantify for economic reasons.
Therefore, peace of mind may be a good that someone is willing to pay
for, but usually is not considered under economic analysis because it is so
difficult to measure for any modeling purpose. That is one quality of a tra-
ditional economic good; it can be measured, and it is usually material.
Other attributes are that the good be divisible and transferable. If the good
cannot be divided and transferred, then it is difficult for any market to de-
velop for the good. Another quality that is important is that ownership
rights be clearly defined and supported. It is very difficult to claim one's
own peace of mind, and then transfer it to another.
Since efficiency deals with values surrounding economic goods, it is
necessary to focus on what is efficiency. Three areas of efficiency will be
considered. The first is that the market correctly values the good in ques-
tion. This can be called an informational or price valuation efficiency.
Second, efficiency concerns the distribution of goods to those who value
them most. Under economic theory, valuation is very simple. The person
who values a good most is the one who is willing and able to pay the most
for it. 15 Third, and often part of the first area, is that efficient markets for
goods are those that are competitive. The reason this overlaps with the first
definition is that some may argue that competitive markets are necessary
to determine prices accurately.
All of this indicates that a series of steps needs to occur when evalu-
ating a policy, law, or regulation. First, one must ask whether the good is
traditionally an economic good. If it is not, then an objective, rational
noneconomic value inquiry may proceed. When it is an economic good,
economic analysis should be the proper standard. Assuming it is an eco-
nomic good, the second question to ask is whether the policy is efficient
regarding the market for the good and its distribution. This requires a
three-part analysis. Does the policy result in the good's price being accu-
rately determined? Next, are those who value the good most receiving it?
Lastly, is the market for the good competitive? Spectrum policy needs to
meet these criteria.
158. Willingness to pay for such a good is only partly correct. One must also be able to
effectualize this demand. The concept of effective demand goes back even to the time of
Adam Smith, and in essence means that one can sufficiently afford to pay for what one de-
mands. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 56 (Modern Library ed., Random House 1965) (1776). This concept arises in
Smith's analysis of natural and market prices in Book I, Chapter VII. A person may demand
a Rolls Royce, but cannot afford it. That person would lack effective demand for that auto-
mobile. So efficiency requires that the good go to the person who values it most, meaning
to the person who is willing and able to pay for the good.
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Efficiency analysis should drive spectrum policy because of the na-
ture of spectrum itself. The qualities of spectrum define it traditionally
within the realm of economic goods. While the science is more compli-
cated, it shares many of the same attributes that land does. First, it is di-
visible. Second, the rights can be transferred. Actually, the spectrum rights
alone can be transferred at a minimal price (although the structure needed
to use such spectrum is quite expensive). Third, spectrum can be used for
multiple purposes, and the nature of the spectrum bandwidth determines
the use much like certain land is useful for agriculture or manufacturing.
Finally, spectrum can be clearly demarcated, and ownership rights can be
asserted. These qualities of spectrum make it similar to almost all eco-
nomic goods.
B. What Would an Efficient Spectrum Policy Look Like?
Spectrum generally should be regarded more like property than it is
currently. At present, applicants are receiving licenses to provide specific
services to the public. This means that those rights are more like a land-use
permit than fee simple ownership of the spectrum.'59 This type of distribu-
tion is inefficient because it does not allow several things. First, the spec-
trum is not necessarily put to its most efficient use. The FCC may have
determined what type of service may be provided on a particular band of
spectrum, but it is doubtful whether such a use would be as efficient as a
profit-maximizing owner. If more profits could be made by using spectrum
for PCS than another activity, then PCS will prosper. Spectrum should be
put to its most valued use.
It is also the case that some entities that value the spectrum more may
be denied its use because their plan of service is not the same as the FCC's
plan. This is an inefficient outcome. While the FCC does attempt to assign
spectrum to its most efficient use, private valuation will often differ from
the FCC's notion of the public interest. The FCC should be relegated to the
role of the traffic cop, only preventing owners from interfering with other
spectrum users.
1. The Argument for Private Property
Many arguments have been introduced in favor of private property.
John Locke argued that since a person has ownership over himself, what-
159. Kurt A. Wimmer & Lee . Tiedrich, Competitive Bidding and Personal Communi-
cations Services: A New Paradigm for FCC Licensing, 3 CoMMLAW CONSPECTUS 17, 19
(1994).
160. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13
(1959).
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ever is removed from the state of nature and then mixed with his labor
should be considered his private property. David Hume gave a three-part
justification for property rights: human beings seek to improve their lives;
people are benevolent toward other people, but not unlimitedly benevolent;
and nature has only provided limited provisions for the fulfillment of
wants. Hume argues that these reasons make necessary a system of prop-
erty rules and rights that allow people to follow their own interests and co-
operate with other people. 16
This Note contends that the best justification of property rights re-
garding economic goods (including spectrum) is given by economist
George Reisman. Private property is important because it relates to three
factors essential to economic production: the profit motive, freedom of
competition in the market, and division of labor. The profit motive creates
the incentive to expand and improve production. It also balances the
proper relative size of industry. Reisman notes:
The profit motive is what balances the demand and supply of each
product and ensures the most rational and efficient distribution of each
product over space and time-among all the markets that compete for
it-and its delivery into the hands of those individuals who, within the
limits of their wealth and income, need or desire it the most.
Private ownership is important in this context because it provides the
superstructure of profit and loss incentives. It is private property that will
be gained or lost by the producers of a good.' 6' Not only is the incentive for
profit and loss important, but private property also ensures that a pro-
ducer's control over the means of production corresponds to whether the
property is used profitably or unprofitably.' 66 If an owner is using the
means of production profitably, then he is able to save and reinvest those
profits, thereby increasing his ownership of the means of production. The
owner who is unprofitable will lack funds to maintain or replace the means
of production under his control.'7
Also important to economic production is the principle of competi-
tion. "If the profit motive is the engine which drives the price system,
competition and the freedom of competition are the built-in regulator
161. JoHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT 128 (Mark Goldie ed., Guernsey
Press Co. 1996) (1690).
162. DAvID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATuRE 536-53 (Ernest Mossner ed., Penguin
Books 1985) (1739).
163. GEORGE REISMAN, CAPITALISM: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 138 (1996).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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which provide the essential context in which that engine operates."' The
right to compete in the marketplace is itself part of the concept of property
rights. Freedom of competition is the ability of producers and owners to
use the means of production in any industry in which they see fit.169 Private
property in the context of spectrum would allow the owners to truly see the
profit and loss derived from ownership of the spectrum. It would also al-
low them to use the spectrum they own in any capacity they wish.
What makes the free market system productive is division of labor.
The concept of division of labor is that production of goods tends to be
performed by those who can do it best. The importance of the division of
labor cannot be underestimated. The process establishes which individuals
are best at an occupation, what products will be produced in a given mar-
ket, and what technology will be employed in production. Division of
labor is dependent upon the profit motive and economic competition.
Competition determines noneconomic decisions of market organizations in
a division-of-labor society. "Economic competition is necessary because
the most efficient form of organization of a division-of-labor society is not
automatically known."'172 As technology, products, and markets change,
competition is the most efficient means of incorporating and evaluating the
inevitable changes that will occur in the future.
Reisman's analysis applies to all economic goods, including the
spectrum. Competition and the profit motive are necessary for the produc-
tive use of scarce resources like spectrum. Private ownership of spectrum
is necessary to this process. Everyone benefits from the division of labor in
society-not just the capitalist, but the population as a whole. Necessary to
this division of labor is economic competition and the profit motive. These
principles in turn derive from private ownership of the means of produc-
tion like spectrum.
R.H. Coase in his article, The Federal Communications Commission,
also makes a persuasive argument why the most efficient spectrum policy
is to define spectrum as property. 173 While confusion did reign in early
spectrum broadcast use before regulation occurred, the reason is that no
property rights were created in the frequencies. In comparing frequency
policy to private property, Coase states:
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 144.
171. Id.
172- Id.
173. Coase, supra note 160. While Coase was only writing about broadcast spectrum,
his arguments equally apply to more advanced users of spectrum.
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Land, labor, and capital are all scarce, but this, of itself, does not call
for government regulation. It is true that some mechanism has to be
employed to decide who, out of the many claimants, should be allowed
to use the scarce resource. But the way this is usually done in the
American economic system is to employ the price mechanism, and this
allocates resources to users without the need for government regula-
tion."
Users would be able to buy the right to use a frequency in the manner
in which they see fit with the restriction that they do not interfere with
other users. To draw from the property analogy, simply because there are
two different uses for a piece of land does not mean that a government
agency must assign the proper use of that land. The government only need
create sufficient property rights in the land and allow the market to distrib-
ute the land to the person who values it Most. 17
The important thing about property rights is that efficiency is en-
hanced because there is a reduction in transaction costs. Distribution and
rent seeking by parties, either lobbying the FCC outright for licenses in a
competitive hearing or for favorable auction rules for their group, is a
wasteful use of resources from the view of society as a whole. By creating
a one-time auction of spectrum and corresponding property rights, price
negotiations can occur that reduce the transaction costs in a change of
spectrum distribution. To truly recognize the cost of spectrum, such nego-
tiation and sale of spectrum should also apply to government 
agencies.
Under a Coasian analysis, the aim of the FCC should not strictly be
to minimize interference, but through an initial distribution of property
rights, to maximize output.177 Any kind of property right interferes with
someone's opportunity to use a resource, but the goal should be that gains
from interference offset the costs of that interference. This analysis
means that once the rights of users have been initially determined, the sec-
ondary market would best rearrange spectrum to the most valued user. The
simplest way to accomplish this is through an auction to the highest bidder
and most valued user.79 This in turn brings the analysis of what an auction
should look like.
174. Id. at 14.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 21.
177. Id. at 27.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 30.
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2. Efficient Auctions
For the most part the FCC auctions have been relatively successful in
allocating spectrum to the user who values it most. There are two problems
with FCC policy. First, the licenses are not treated as property to be dis-
tributed by the auction. Secondly, the FCC should not have strayed from
the prepayment of licenses in the C block auction. The Simultaneous As-
cending Auction (SAA) is very efficient as a means of distribution. Activ-
ity rules are put in place to keep bidders from holding back bids and for
keeping the auction moving forward at a good pace. 80 The SAA also has
advantages over traditional auction techniques such as a sequential auction
of licenses or offering all licenses in a single round using sealed bids.'
8
'
The reasons for not using these traditional auctions are many. One
reason is that there are close substitutes for most licenses, and licenses are
complementary. Complementary licenses are important because it means
that the individual license is more valuable depending upon whether the
user holds licenses for the contiguous area. 1 2 This means that it is more
efficient for some bidders to win licenses within contiguous areas. The
SAA form of auction is efficient in this regard because of the simultaneous
and ascending features of the auction. The ascending character of bids al-
lows a bidder to view how his competitors value licenses and for which
aggregations those competitors are bidding.18' The simultaneous feature
allows a built-in flexibility for bidders to choose whatever aggregation
they seek to win and to change their bid depending upon what others are
bidding for that aggregation. 84This allows a bidder to have better infor-
mation on what bids it can match unlike a sealed bid auction where bid-
ding is blind. 1
5
The FCC is experimenting with combinatorial bidding, which should
be implemented if found to increase the efficiency of auction allocation. In
short, combinatorial bidding allows an entity to enter a package bid for a
116group of licenses. The example used by the FCC is to suppose Bidder A
places a $100,000 bid for licenses one, two, and four, and Bidder B places
a $500,000 bid for licenses two, three, and five. A computer system will
then calculate the revenue maximization of the bids and award the highest
180. R. Preston McMee & John McMillan, Analyzing the Airwaves Auction, 10 J. ECON.
PERSP. 159, 160 (1996).
181. Id. at 161.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 162.
186. Spectrum Auctions Report, supra note 3, at 9606 box 1.
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bids during that round to the respective package.' 7 This type of auction is
advantageous when strong synergies exist among licenses and preferences
by bidders. A corporation such as AT&T may only be able to implement
its business plan if it can win a nationwide service area, while a small
company may only need local service area licenses.' This is one im-
provement that could and should be made if feasible because it improves
efficiency in the auction process. Since this is one area where the FCC has
done quite well, it is necessary to consider whether congressional goals for
the FCC are efficient.
3. Congressional Goals for the FCC
While the FCC does have some latitude in determining policy for the
spectrum, change must occur at the legislative level. Goals that must be
evaluated are auctions as a means to raise revenue, provision of incentives
to both diversify spectrum and increase competition, and swift distribution
of spectrum to create networks quickly. While Congress wanted the FCC
to raise revenue for the government, it was not the fundamental goal of the
auction process. As long as the spectrum is distributed to its highest user at
an affordable cost, society will be better off applying the revenue to the
national debt.
One means of increasing revenue is to give bidding credits to force
bidders to increase bids to the price at which they value the license. This
does not always occur because a winning bid must only beat the second
highest bidder, and not necessarily approximate what the winner is willing
to pay for it. 89 The main problem with such bidding credits is that there
has to be some reasonable approximation of the bidders' valuations. If this
could be done, it would be better to just sell the license at the amount val-
ued. Also, to be successful, such credits must have significant restraints on
secondary market transactions. Licenses may also go to an entity that val-
ues the license less when a bidding credit is given to a small bidder in or-
der to stimulate a large bidder, but the large bidder's valuation is incorrect.
The smaller bidder could win the license, and the FCC would have to pay
for part of it with the credit amount. Given all the informational problems
with predicting valuations, bidding credits to increase revenue should be
avoided.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See generally Ian Ayres "& Peter Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through Diversity:
How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 STAN. L. REv. 761
(1996).
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Increasing revenue for the government should not itself be a signifi-
cant goal. Revenue maximization is not itself efficient. The only thing it
accomplishes is redistributing money from the buying entity to the gov-
ernment. Spectrum policy should and has focused upon bringing service to
the market quickly and placing spectrum in the hands of those who value it
most. Divergence from this goal is unnecessary.
The FCC has also been given the task of increasing diversity and
competition in the market for spectrum. First, diversity should not be the
primary goal of the FCC. The quest for diversity is what created many of
the problems in the C block auction. The primary problem is that under
FCC rules, diverse companies were those entities that had little capital or
experience in the spectrum market. If an entity values spectrum more, then
it is efficient for that entity to receive it. It does not matter whether the
owners are entrepreneurs, minorities, or women. When determining the
allocation of an economic good, such considerations are irrelevant.
The focus upon competition on the other hand is a little more com-
plex. While it may appear that sufficient competition exists now, it is al-
ways possible that in the future more companies need to be in the market
to make it competitive. The burden, it would seem, is on the FCC to dem-
onstrate why special terms of financing and special designated blocks of
spectrum are needed. What has also not been established is the number of
industry participants necessary for adequate competition in the market.
These concerns should be addressed before installment payment programs
and other measures are used in the future.
There are two main problems with the use of installment payments
and special designations for small businesses. First is the assumption that
capital markets are inefficient. While the capital market may not be com-
pletely efficient, it only needs to be more efficient than the FCC. Since the
FCC did not even consider ability to pay, in fact the qualifications used
were contrary to ability to pay, the private capital markets would be better
at picking companies to equip with financing for an auction. The mistake
was to value small and minority business in and of themselves. Instead,
private markets would value those businesses (which may include smaller
corporations) that had the financial ability to pay, or those businesses with
better business plans and forecasts.
The second point is closely related. The FCC should never put itself
in the position of creditor. This is especially the case when the companies
singled out are smaller concerns. Private lending institutions and capital
markets are much better at handling debt arrangement and collection. It
will rarely be efficient to determine lending rates outside of the market
without tailoring those rates to the individual company. The use of blanket
terms of interest and installment payments is absurd because not all win-
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ners will be in the same situation. The main point here is that the FCC was
not required to conduct itself according to the rigorous standards of a mar-
ket actor, but in the name of diversity ignored many of the economic reali-
ties regarding small businesses. Competition is a worthy goal, and the FCC
should encourage many to participate, but there should not be special des-
ignations for some entities without a rational reason. The default situation
should be a more complete set of property rights for the spectrum.
The last congressional goal given to the FCC is to speed spectrum li-
censes to the public so that systems are built-out rapidly. This congres-
sional goal is efficient and is another reason why the FCC should not focus
on small business and installment payments. The goal of rapid deployment
is to bring services to the market quickly. One reason this is so important
is to reduce barriers to entry. The longer some businesses have licenses,
while other licenses are held up, the greater opportunity prior winners have
to gain what may be a difficult, even insurmountable advantage. This is
where ability to pay becomes important. Under the definition of a small
business used by the FCC, the companies most likely to not have proper
financing to build a system will win a license.
Also important for the quick deployment of services is the payment
up front for spectrum instead of allowing installment payments. Often, up-
front payments force either a prompt payment or prompt default and
reauction of spectrum. The up-front payment makes a company obtain fi-
nancing before the auction so that it can pay the bid price promptly after
winning. By allowing installment payments, there is the uncertainty of a
company defaulting on its license, and then the delay of reauctioning the
license to a user who values it. Also, up-front payments help in the valua-
tion of spectrum because a company must base more of its bid on present
conditions. When offered installment payments, not only is the prediction
of advanced future revenue required, but a firm must also predict the fu-
ture capital market's ability to refund future payments to the FCC. Incen-
tives for rapid deployment may in some circumstances be used, but these
should not include installment payments.
VII. CONCLUSION
Spectrum allocation by means of an auction has worked well. There
are only a few changes that would ensure a more efficient market. The first
of these would be to give spectrum the same rights as property and for the
FCC to act more like a traffic officer. By giving a property right in auc-
tioned spectrum, there is more development of long-term infrastructure;
additional uses and experimentation with spectrum technology are encour-
aged; and private negotiation of spectrum conflicts or disputes can occur
once legal rights are established. These changes, while efficient, are not
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always advocated because of the fear of monopoly power, but there has
been nothing to support these fears.
The C block auction demonstrates how some auctions can go wrong.
There are a few things that Congress and the FCC should learn from this.
Diversity and competition are not necessarily the same. What the market
needs is good competition regardless of whether the company is small, mi-
nority, or woman-owned. It is a mistake to assume that monopoly power
will occur because many large companies engaged in the bidding. Part of
the rationale for encouraging small business ownership is local control and
diversification. This ignores the many economies of scale that larger com-
panies will enjoy.
While the FCC needs to fix the current problem, it also needs to re-
member that companies with imperfect information need to be able to rely
on the auction rules. The best way to accomplish this is to allow current
payments to resume under the installment plan, or to allow prepayment at
the net present value of the bid. In general, installment payments should
not be used in further auctions. The risks of uncertainty are high, and the
FCC is not efficient as a creditor because it has no experience in the lend-
ing area. If lending is to occur, the FCC must be able to evaluate compa-
nies on an individual basis to determine the feasibility of payment plans.
In general, the problems that existed within the C block auction were
created because too many goals were given to the FCC, and efficiency was
not primary. Although helping small, minority, and woman-owned busi-
nesses may be valuable from a moral standpoint, the efficiency of the mar-
ket should be the primary concern. This means an emphasis on the true
valuation of the market value of spectrum, distribution of spectrum to the
most valued user, and the ability to create a sufficiently competitive mar-
ket. It should be noted that spectrum is a scarce economic good just like
land and other items treated as property. When one tends to view the spec-
trum as a public policy experiment, with all the rent seeking that can occur
through the legislative and regulatory process, efficiency shifts to the pe-
riphery. Efficiency should be the primary goal of congressional and FCC
spectrum policy.
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